

REMARKS

Objections to the specification

Claims 24, 33, and 37 have been objected to because the terminology “machine readable medium” is not disclosed in the specification. Applicant has removed this terminology from the claims by amendment, rendering this objection moot.

Claim rejections under 35 USC 101

Claims 20-37 have been rejected under 35 USC 101, as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, because a computer program product is not embodied in a computer/machine readable storage medium. Applicant has amended these claims to recite a computer-readable data storage medium. Applicant notes that paragraph [0189] of the patent application states that the invention can be implemented by a programmed machine, where paragraph [0088] discloses an example of such a machine – a personal computer that has a memory. A memory of course is an example of a computer-readable data storage medium, since data can be stored on a memory.

Applicant submits that these claim amendments are proper. The MPEP states that “[t]he subject matter of [a] claim need not be described *literally* (i.e., using the same terms or *in haec verba*) in order for the disclosure to satisfy the description requirement” (MPEP sec. 2163.02, emphasis added). The general rule, particularly for inventions in predictable arts, is that claims can cover more than the specific embodiments shown (see *In re Newton*, 414 F.2d 1400, 1406, 163 USPQ 34, 39 (CCPA 1969)). The written description requirement is satisfied even if claims cover more than what is described in the specification (see *In re Smythe*, 480 F.2d 1376, 178 USPQ 279, 284 (CCPA 1973)).

In light of the foregoing amendments, Applicant requests the withdrawal of the rejections under 35 USC 101.

Claim rejections under 35 USC 103

Claims 1-37 have been rejected under 35 USC 103(a) as being unpatentable over Treptow (2002/0138564) and Lahey (2005/0228711). Claims 1, 5, 14, 18-20, 24, 33, and 37 are independent claims, from which the remaining claims ultimately depend. Applicant respectfully submits that as previously presented and as currently amended, the independent claims are patentable over Treptow and Lahey, such that the remaining pending claims are patentable at least because they depend from patentable base independent claims.

First, the claimed invention recites a service reference to a status of a job, where the state reference includes data identifying a location where a status page for the job can be obtained. Applicant respectfully submits that Treptow and Lahey do not suggest this feature of the invention. The Examiner has indicated that the URL denoted in paragraph [0081] of Treptow in particular corresponds to this inventive feature.

However, paragraph [0081] states that “the Driverless Print Server messages Status Monitor 116 with the location of the spool file, [and] the URL of the printer where the spool file should be sen[t].” The URL is not a location where a status page for a job can be obtained, but rather is the location (i.e., the printer) where the job itself is sent. That is, the spool file is, corresponds to, or represents the job in Treptow and Lahey. For instance, “after the spool file has been successfully sent to the printer, Status Monitor 116 messages the Driverless Print Server *that the job is complete*” (Treptow, para. [0082]). Therefore, the URL of the printer is not the location where a status page for the job can be obtained, but rather is the location to which the job is actually sent for printing/processing, since the spool file is, corresponds to, or represents the job in question. For at least this reason, Treptow and Lahey do not suggest the claimed invention as a whole.

Second, the claimed invention recites adding the service reference to a status of a job as a bookmark to a bookmark list of a web-browsing computer program. For example, think of the common web-browsing computer program Internet Explorer. You have a Favorites menu, which

when selected presents a list of bookmarks. Thus, in this example, the claimed invention adds the service reference to a status of a job as another bookmark to this list of bookmarks. Applicant respectfully submits that Treptow and Lahey do not suggest this feature of the invention. The Examiner has indicated that paragraph [0088] of Treptow in particular corresponds to this inventive feature.

However, paragraph [0088] states that “activation of print jobs tab 230 causes a lower set of tabs to be rendered, as shown in FIG. 9,” where “activation of a more info button 260 [in FIG. 9] enables the administrator to see more information for a selected print job.” FIG. 9 of Treptow shows a web page rendered in Internet Explorer, which as described in paragraph [0088] includes a more info button that when selected displays the status information of a print job. Treptow and Lahey do not disclose, however, that the location to which this status information is obtained is specifically added *as a bookmark to the bookmark list* of the web-browsing computer program in question, Internet Explorer. Rather, the user browses to a particular web page as depicted in FIG. 9, and thereafter has to select a button to call up the status information – a bookmark to this web page is never added to the bookmark list of the web-browsing computer program. Therefore, the location where such status information can be obtained is not added as a bookmark to the bookmark list of the web-browsing computer program in Treptow and Lahey. For at least this reason as well, Treptow and Lahey do not suggest the claimed invention as a whole.

Respectfully Submitted,



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